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白山市人民政府关于印发白山市信访事项督查督办工作规则的通知

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白山市人民政府关于印发白山市信访事项督查督办工作规则的通知

吉林省白山市人民政府


白山市人民政府关于印发白山市信访事项督查督办工作规则的通知


白山政发〔2005〕28号


各县(市)区人民政府,市政府各委办局、事业单位,中省直单位:
  现将《白山市信访事项督查督办工作规则》印发给你们,请认真按照执行。




二○○五年十二月五日

白山市信访事项督查督办工作规则

  第一章 总 则

  第一条 为了贯彻落实《信访条例》(国务院第 431 号令),依法规范信访督查督办行为,建立职责明确、协调统一、运转有序的工作机制,提高信访工作的质量和效率,特制定本规则。
  第二条 信访事项督查督办工作应当以邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导,坚持立党为公、执政为民,强化政治意识、大局意识和责任意识,严格依法按政策办事,确保党中央国务院、省委省政府、市委市政府关于信访工作的各项决策和部署得到贯彻落实,确保《信访条例》的各项规定得到贯彻实施,确保督查督办的信访事项得到妥善处理。
  第三条 对信访事项,实行重点督查督办和一般督查督办相结合的工作机制。市信访局督查室负责省立案交办,省委省政府、市委市政府和本局领导交办与本局立案的信访事项的督查督办工作。
  第二章 工作原则

  第四条 坚持实事求是的原则。督办案件应当求真务实,做到察实情、说实话,准确、全面、客观,经得起检验。
  第五条 坚持依法办事的原则。严格遵守国家法律法规,严格把握政策界限,严格执行工作程序和制度。
  第六条 坚持突出重点的原则。围绕党和国家的中心工作,督促解决信访群众反映的热点难点问题和信访工作存在的突出问题。
  第七条 坚持注重实效的原则。结合本地、本部门工作实际,坚决避免形式主义,善于抓住主要矛盾,狠抓落实,不留尾巴。
  第八条 坚持依靠地方党委、政府和职能部门的原则。既要结合案情独立进行分析和判断,又要尊重地方党委、政府和职能部门的意见,保证督查督办事项的落实。
  第三章 工作程序

  第九条 立案。
  对下列信访事项应予立案:
  (一)群众信访反映贯彻执行党的路线、方针、政策,以及改革开放和经济建设中的重大事项;
  (二)在执行党的政策中出现偏差,需要纠正办理的事项;
  (三)群众集体上访或多人联名信反映强烈,需要深入调查处理的事项;
  (四)历史遗留的政策性信访事项;
  (五)各级、各部门协调困难的重要来信来访事项;
  (六)信访工作机构或上级行政机关交办和转送的信访事项;
  (七)上级和本级党政领导批示交办和转送的信访事项;
  (八)其他需要立案处理的重要信访事项。
  第十条 交办。
  (一)市信访局对立案信访事项的交办,以“两函一书”形式为主,即:《中共白山市委白山市人民政府信访局信访事项交办函》、《白山市人民政府办公室信访任务交办函》和《白山市人民政府信访任务通知书》。根据实际情况的需要,也可采取其他交办形式。
  (二)市信访局的交办函件可直接发至下级党委、政府或者信访工作机构,以及本级有权处理信访事项的行政机关。对交办的信访事项,应严格按照《信访条例》规定的时限提出报结时间。
  第十一条 查处。
  (一)对市信访局及上级行政机关交办、转送的信访事项,有权处理的行政机关收到后应当及时作出是否受理决定。决定受理的,应当及时立案,并进入查办程序;自收到该信访事项之日起 15 日内,承办机关无论受理与否,均须将有关意见反馈给交办机关。
  (二)在调查处理信访事项过程中,承办机关应当认真听取信访人的投诉请求;在事实清楚的前提下,正确适用法律法规和政策,提出恰当的处理意见,明确办理期限,督促处理意见的落实,并做好回访工作。
  1.事实清楚。对信访事项发生的时间、地点、涉及的当事人、起因和发生的过程、造成的后果、有关机关是否做过处理等,均须清楚明了。
  2.处理意见恰当。处理意见必须根据调查核实的事实,正确适用法律法规和政策。对没有政策规定或政策规定不明确的信访事项,既要充分考虑历史背景,又要从实际出发,做到妥善处理。
  3.处理意见要落实。因条件所限不能在规定期限内落实处理意见的,必须有落实方案,明确落实责任单位、责任人和时限。
  4.程序规范。受理、办理、审核、报送等工作程序符合法律法规和有关规定,做到材料完整、手续齐全。
  5.期限明确。对承办的信访事项,承办机关应当自立案之日起 60 日内办结;需要延长期限的,最长不得超过 30 日;但法律法规另有规定的,从其规定。上级机关或领导有时限要求的,可按其要求办理。
  6.出据《立案信访事项办理意见书》并搞好回访工作。原则上,《办理意见书》应当面送交信访人并进行回访,在向信访人讲清基本事实、政策依据、处理意见后,请信访人在《立案信访事项办理意见书》上签署意见,并告知信访人如对处理意见不服,可在 30 日内提出复查、复核的请求。
  7.《立案信访事项办理意见书》同时报送交办机关、上级复查机关。
  (三)对情况复杂的信访事项,受理机关在 60 日内不能办结,确需要延长办理期限的,按以下规定办理:
  1.本级直接立案的信访事项确需延长期限的,由本级机关的负责人批准。
  2.交办的信访事项确需延长期限的,应在要求办结时限前 20 日内向交办机关写出延期申请,并书面报告工作进度,经同意后方可延期。
  3.告知信访人,说明延长期限的理由。
  第十二条 复查。
  (一)信访人对有关行政机关作出的处理意见不服的,可以自收到《立案信访事项办理意见书》之日起 30 日内,请求原办理机关的上一级行政机关复查。
  (二)收到复查请求的行政机关,应当自收到复查请求之日起 30 日内复查完毕。
  (三)复查意见以《立案信访事项复查意见书》答复信访人。
  (四)将复查意见书面告知原处理机关,并将《立案信访事项复查意见书》送同级信访工作机构,由信访工作机构负责系统内的上通下达。
  (六)信访人无正当理由,自收到《立案信访事项办理意见书》之日起 30 日内没有请求复查,再就同一问题提出投诉请求的,不予受理。
第十三条 复核。
  (一)信访人对复查意见不服的,可以自收到《立案信访事项复查意见书》之日起 30 日内,向复查机关的上一级机关请求复核。
  (二)收到复核请求的行政机关,应当自收到复核请求之日起, 30 日内复核完毕。
  (三)复核意见书面告知原受理机关和复查机关,并以《立案信访事项复核意见书》告知信访人,复核意见为终结意见。
  (四)信访人无正当理由,自收到《立案信访事项复查意见书》之日起 30 日内没有请求复核的,再就同一问题提出投诉请求的,不予受理。
(五)受理、复查、复核机关可视情况举行公开听证,经过听证的意见可依法向社会公示。
  第十四条 报审。
  (一)交办的信访事项,应当按照时限向交办机关报告办理结果。直接交办的,直接报告;逐级交办的,逐级审查逐级报告。办结报告必须经报告单位分管领导审查同意并签字;通过信访工作机构交办的信访事项,应当有信访部门的审查意见。
  (二)办结报告内容必须做到:信访人反映问题表述清楚、全面;调查过程完整、清晰;适用的法律法规和政策标注明确;处理意见和落实情况明了;有关材料的附件齐全。办结报告的报送份数一般为 4 份;有特殊要求的,应当按照要求办理。
  (三)信访事项的交办机关要认真审查报告。对不符合要求的,应当提出改进意见或退回办理机关重新调查处理;对需要向上级机关或领导报告的,应当及时报告。
  第十五条 督办。
  (一)县级以上信访工作机构必须对交办信访事项的办理全程督查督办。
  (二)在规定时限内承办单位未办结交办信访事项的,交办机关应及时进行督办,并要求其说明理由或书面报告进展情况。
  (三)督办主要采取电话督办、书面督办、约请督办、实地督办和联合督办等方式。
  第十六条 归档。
  督查督办事项结案后应当及时立卷归档,有条件的可建立电子档案。
  第四章 建议权的使用

  第十七条 改进工作建议权的使用。
  在督查督办工作中发现行政机关有下列情形之一的,应当及时督办,并经有关领导同意后提出改进建议:
  (一)无正当理由未按规定的办理期限办结信访事项的;
  (二)未按规定反馈信访事项办理结果的;
  (三)未按规定程序办理信访事项的;
  (四)办理信访事项推诿、敷衍、拖延的;
  (五)不执行信访事项处理意见的;
  (六)其他需要督办的情形。
收到改进建议的行政机关应当在 30 日内书面反馈情况;未采纳改进建议的,应当书面说明理由。
  第十八条 完善政策建议权的使用。
对于信访人反映的有关政策性问题,需要提请有关地方或部门研究完善的,经有关领导批准后,送请有关地方或部门研究处理。重要的政治性问题,及时向本级政府报告,并提出完善政策、解决问题的建议。
  第十九条 行政处分建议权的使用。
在督查督办工作中发现行政机关工作人员在信访工作中有违反法律法规和《信访条例》规定的行为,并造成严重后果,应当受到行政处分的,按照干部管理权限,向有关行政机关提出对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员给予行政处分的建议。
第五章 工作纪律

  第二十条 督查督办工作纪律。督查督办工作人员应当遵纪守法、廉洁自律、保守秘密,按照《保守国家秘密法》的规定履行批准手续,采取严格的安全保密措施。
第六章 附则

  二十一条 本规定自印发之日起施行。



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劳动和社会保障部关于第四季度落实四项目标确保养老金按时足额发放的通知

劳动和社会保障部


劳动和社会保障部关于第四季度落实四项目标确保养老金按时足额发放的通知
劳动和社会保障部




各省、自治区、直辖市劳动(劳动和社会保障)厅(局):
今年五月全国国有企业下岗职工基本生活保障和再就业工作会议以来,各级劳动保障部门在各级党委、政府的领导下,认真贯彻落实《中共中央、国务院关于切实做好国有企业下岗职工基本生活保障和再就业工作的通知》(中发〔1998〕10号)和《国务院关于企业职工基本养老
保险省级统筹和行业统筹移交地方管理有关问题的通知》(国发〔1998〕28号)的精神,以高度的政治责任感积极工作,不畏艰难,埋头苦干,在推进养老保险制度改革、确保企业离退休人员养老金按时足额发放方面取得了阶段性成果,受到了广大离退休人员的普遍拥护,促进了社
会稳定。但是,就全国而言,还有个别地区仍有拖欠养老金问题发生;今年五月以前拖欠的养老金,大多数地区还未能补发;同时,基金调剂力度小,养老保险基金支撑能力下降的矛盾愈加突出。
为巩固前一阶段的工作成果,加强基本养老保险基金支撑能力,确保养老金按时足额发放,现提出第四季度要实现的目标要求:全年基金收缴率不低于90%,今年底之前对累计拖欠的养老金至少补发30%,对企业累计欠费至少追缴30%,对挤占挪用基金至少收回30%。现就落
实这四项目标要求的有关问题通知如下:
一、坚持一手抓征缴一手抓发放,两手都要硬。基本养老保险费的及时足额征缴是确保养老金按时足额发放的基础。各级劳动保障部门和社会保险经办机构要把加大基本养老保险费征缴工作力度作为首要任务之一,采取强有力的措施和手段,把基金收缴率促上去,力保今年基金收缴率
不低于90%。特别要注意发挥个人帐户的积极作用,对单位不缴费或非足额缴费的,个人帐户中从单位缴费中划入部分不予记帐。要通过广泛深入的宣传和发放个人帐户对帐单等形式,形成职工从关心、维护自身养老保险权益出发,自觉监督、督促企业按时足额缴纳基本养老保险费的机
制。
二、积极筹措资金,解决过去拖欠问题。各级劳动保障部门和社会保险经办机构,要在保证每月按时足额发放养老金,不发生新的拖欠的基础上,尽快补发过去拖欠的企业离退休人员的基本养老金。凡因社会保险经办机构原因形成的拖欠,社会保险经办机构要立即调度资金予以补发;
凡由企业造成的拖欠,劳动保障部门和社会保险经办机构要指导督促企业制定补发计划,积极筹措资金,尽快补发到位。各地要从实际出发,力争尽快补发,凡拖欠金额不多,具备补发条件的,原则上应在今年底前补发完毕;拖欠金额较多,资金紧张,今年底前不能全部补发的,今年补发
的数额不得低于累计拖欠养老金数额的30%,其余部分应在1999年9月底以前全部补发完毕。
三、大力清理企业欠费,增强基金支撑能力。近年来,企业欠缴基本养老保险费数额不断增加,已成为养老保险费征缴率降低、基金支撑能力下降的重要原因。各级劳动保障部门和社会保险经办机构要抓住解决拖欠养老金问题的有利时机,积极争取党委和政府的支持,采取有力措施,
推动清欠工作的开展。在清理企业欠费工作中要坚决贯彻国务院领导同志“执法要严”的指示精神,对欠缴的企业逐一认定其偿还能力,制定切实可行的清欠计划。凡能够正常发放职工工资或基本生活费的企业,其欠缴的基本养老保险费必须尽快补缴。清欠工作要把欠费大户作为重点,千
方百计督促这些企业按规定补缴。对有能力补缴而拒不补缴的企业,要予以通报批评,并采取综合的行政、经济手段予以处罚。要注意发挥广播、电视、报纸等舆论工具的监督作用,加大舆论监督力度,必要时对欠费典型给予曝光,促其偿还欠费。今年年底以前,各地至少要清理收回企业
欠费的30%,其余部分应在明年底前全部收回。
四、加大力度,抓紧收回被挤占挪用的基本养老保险基金。各地要坚决按照国务院关于加强基本养老保险基金管理,确保基金安全的要求,高度重视被挤占挪用的基本养老保险基金的清理收回工作。各级劳动保障部门要组成专门的回收基金工作小组,按照已查明的挪用项目,逐项制定
回收计划。清理回收工作要落实责任制,坚持谁批准动用谁负责收回的原则,各级劳动保障部门和社会保险经办机构自行挤占挪用的要列为第一批计划首先收回。对造成损失确实无法全部归还的资金,要追究有关责任人的责任,并及时报劳动和社会保障部备案。为加快清理收回收工作进度
,对截止今年三月底清查出的被挤占挪用的基本养老保险基金,今年年底前至少收回30%,其余部分必须在1999年9月底以前全部收回。
加强基本养老保险基金征缴,补发拖欠的养老金,清理回收企业欠费和被挤占挪用的基本养老保险基金,关系到确保企业离退休人员养老金的按时足额发放和维护社会稳定的全局,必须高度重视,切实做好。各级劳动保障部门和社会保险经办机构,要从讲政治的大局出发,增强责任感
,加大工作力度,加强监督检查,不折不扣地贯彻党中央、国务院的决策,发扬抗洪精神,加大力度,狠抓落实,全面完成各项工作目标。
各地提高基本养老保险费征缴率、补发拖欠的养老金、清理企业欠费、回收被挤占挪用基金的具体指标和进度安排,由我部社会保险事业管理局近日另行下达,并从11月开始实行每月数据调度和督查制度。各地在执行中的经验、情况和问题,请及时向我部反映。



1998年10月22日


The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.